The Indus Valley civilization, it transpires from the main archaeological findings, boasted of civic amenities and social norms of a high order, and an enviable agricultural system. Yet that civilization huddled into isolated fortress communities, and that spelt its doom at the hands of Trans-Caucasian Aryan invaders. Out for conquest and plunder, the latter forced the north-western passages to fall upon a land which, to them, seemed to flow with milk and honey.
This mixed grouping kept expanding into a near military vacuum, in pastoral serenity. As millennia rolled by, the savage lust and hunger ebbed, replaced by an ordered, stratified society of great orthodoxy. Its societal norms found an ethos in the workplace, the system of rights and privileges, and service under the flag.
By the tenth century BC, Army organization correlated with societal norms. Command, for better or worse, was vested in the temporal head - the king - no matter whether he was good at it. The division of the field army into four arms - the Chaturangbalas- was a superb innovation. Horse-drawn war chariots preceded war elephants, mounted soldiers, and foot soldiers. The chariot and the elephant mattered more, apparently because they provided stable weapon handling platforms. The stirrup had yet to be discovered. The moment the toe and later the full stirrup came in vogue, the chariot became merely ceremonial. It was the foot soldier that marched to war and took the brunt of attrition on his broad shoulders - the 'Poor Bloody Infantry'. The horse-mounted element was comparable to the latter-day dragoons, who rode to the battlefield but dismounted to fight.
Under good centralized leadership and uniform training standards, Indian field forces excelled. Under successive Mauryan kings there was no chance for a full-scale heartland invasion for a raider. Alexander the Great bit into the north-west periphery, veered north, and departed the scene. By 262 BC, relying on fast-moving cavalry for long marches, Emperor Ashok had unified two-thirds of the subcontinental landmass.
Under the Guptas again, Central Asian invaders like the Huns, who in their day razed and plundered a major portion of the known civilized world, were to stand checked as late as the sixth century AD. But time was marching on. Once again, a myopic civilization allowed its societal norms to pervade its military thinking, code, and even conduct in the field. The military, after all, Mirrors the society it serves; but history would have turned out differently, had the Army of those times been shielded from too much of this pious tenor. No deceit, sleight of hand or deception was allowed under strict rules of engagement, no flanking or attacks in the rear. Against a determined enemy, Prithvi Raj Chauhan scored the first time, defeating Mohammed Ghori at Tarain (1191 AD, 135 kilometers north of Delhi. Returning next year, the wily Ghori had no qualms over exploiting Chauhan's rigid battlefield code. If all is fair in love and war, Ghori richly deserved his victory.
The Hindu Age died out because of defective employment of assets and the curious habit of allowing an invader a free run. No attrition battles were waged on the enemy right from the frontiers or even during his retreat. Defensive thinking dictated policy, putting paid to prospects of victory for individual valour. Tactics were little practiced; strategies barely thought out and technologies were not imbibed.
Word had gone round, in the seventh century itself, that Hindustan was ripe for conquest, plunder and dominion. India's early history is therefore, the story of its conquest and subjugation by adventurous Arabs, Afghans, and Turks who marched into Hindustan to try their luck.
Mohamed bin Qasim, around 711 AD, was the first Arab to lead a successful reconnaissance in force into Sind. On reporting back his success, he lost his head (literally) for extraneous reasons. The Great Desert proper, however, had not yet been penetrated. It was left to later invaders to creep slowly eastward.
Between Ghori and Ghazni of Afghanistan, expeditionary looting was developed into a fine art. Desire for loot now changed into desire to rule, leading to the first Sultanate in Delhi in 1206 AD.
The Delhi Sultanate, established over time (1206-1526), by decisive campaigning brought in fresh war fighting norms, in which victory was the main objective unfettered by any heroic code. Firearms were introduced in the early fourteenth century, with pride of place going to fast moving cavalry released from a defending role in the battlefield. The pivot was still provided by a large group of war elephants and infantry.
The Mughal conquest of India is an object lesson in the superiority of technology and tactics over mere numbers. In 1526, a small army under Babur, of the house of Taimur in Central Asia sailed southward through Afghanistan and on to Hindustan. The small force, served by an artillery line protected by infantry, with free ranging cavalry under decentralized command, defeated a much larger force of Lodhi's sultanate. The kill power of the artillery combined with mobile multi-directional attacks, brought victory to Babur.
In the Mughals' military scheme of things, cavalry and artillery got the pride of place followed by the infantry wielding muskets and bows. Logistical trains consisting of carts drawn by camels, oxen and even donkeys were streamlined such that a field army was ensured freedom of action. Elephants, again, were used at the firm base, or as 'command vehicles'.
The mansabdari system of obtaining a large army for campaigns, with minimal expenditure being incurred by the central authority, was refined and reintroduced under the Mughals. The Delhi Sultans had coined this name for a system long prevalent in the subcontinent. The military peerage, the only aristocracy, were graded according to mansab (or military rank). Princely state contributions flowed in according to the mansab grade, commencing at upkeep and command of 10 to 40,000 troops for blood relatives. Inevitably, such a system bred a wide variation in training standards, loyalty, and morale, and uneven leadership calibre of the mansabdar. Nevertheless, for internal empire building, and keeping outlying principalities in line, this system worked. But the later Mughals sold their inheritance over a period of time to that canny, British trading concern, the East India Company, also known as John Company.
Even under Aurangzeb the mansabdari system was fully stretched by an outstanding leader and military genius - the Maratha chieftain, Chhatrapati Shivaji. He had thoroughly studied, the strengths of the Mughals as well as their weaknesses, and tempered his diplomacy, military doctrine, organization and tactics to capitalize on the latter. The rugged terrain of the Western Ghats, where he operated, could be counted on to slow down large conventional columns. His cavalry, swift and decisive in battle, had great stamina, dedication and skill. It used the raid, hit and run tactics, hounding and harrying but never offering setpiece battle. Shivaji's defensive pivots were his famous hill-top forts, eminently suited for defence against anything but a long investment siege. A commander of incomparable pluck and acumen, he exploited every facet of the military art including deception, to appear where he was least expected and in sufficient strength to carry the day. He was ably assisted by such renowned captains of war as Tanaji, at whose death in battle at Singarh fort he uttered the immortal words, Sinh gele garh ale (The lion is gone, the fort is ours). |
